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ESSAYS 
TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE: WHY WE NEED TO 
INCLUDE TRANSGENDER RIGHTS IN THE 
STRUGGLES FOR SEX AND SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION EQUALIlY 
Taylor Flynn * 
In this Essay, Taylor Flynn observes that sex and sexual orientation 
equality jurisprudence is premised upon the traditional understanding of 
"sex" as determined by anatomy at birth. The presumption typically follow-
ing from this reduction of sex to anatomy is the notion that certain gendered 
attributes are inherent in biological male- or femaleness. Professor Flynn as-
serts that these erroneous and unduly narrow views significantly hamper 
courts' ability to address the core of sex and sexual orientation discrimina-
tion-hostility based on failure to conform to conventional gender norms. 
Surveying workplace, public accommodation, asylum, marriage, and custody 
cases, Flynn explains how conventional jurisprudence fails a wide array of 
persons. Looking to the burgeoning transgender case law, Professor Flynn 
demonstrates how individuals ranging from working women, gay men and 
lesbians, and stay-at-home dads can benefit from a jurisprudence that adopts 
more accurate and multifaceted understandings of sex and gender. 
INTRODUCTION 
The phrase "gay, lesbian, or bisexual"l has in recent years been 
joined by another descriptor, "transgender."2 "Transgender" is an um-
brella term that, in fact, includes gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals within 
its scope: It applies to persons whose appearance, behavior, or other per-
sonal characteristics differ from traditional gender norms.3 The term 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, j.S.M. 
Stanford Law School 1995,j.D. Columbia Law School 1991, B.A. Dartmouth College 1986. 
I would like to thank Jill Anderson, Paisley Currah, Anne Goldstein, Jennifer Levi, and 
Shannon Minter for their insights and the valuable wealth of experience that they 
generously made available to me. Special thanks to Reena Agrawal, Tal Golomb, Kari 
Hong, and Julian Moore for their helpful suggestions and editorial input. 
1. I use this phrase to identify persons for whom a component of our lives includes 
same-sex love, attraction, or intimacy. For simplicity, this Essay at times refers to people 
with a same-sex orientation as "gay." Because this usage may contribute to a discourse that 
renders lesbians and bisexuals invisible, this Essay also uses the term "Ies/bi/gay." 
2. See Jamison Green, Introduction to Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, 
Transgender Equality: A Handbook for Activists and Policymakers 1 (2000). Other 
synonyms for transgender that are also used in this Essay include "gender variant," "gender 
non-conforming," and "trans." I also use the term "sexual minorities" to refer collectively 
to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered individuals. 
3. An increasing number of gay men and lesbians are identifying themselves as 
transgendered, whether because of a nonconforming gender presentation or in 
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represents more than a linguistic shift. It reflects an increasing recogni-
tion that acts of discrimination against a wide variety of groups are often 
pieces of the same quilt, with intolerance of gender nonconformity as its 
thread. The concept of transgenderism recognizes that discrimination 
against women, gay persons, and transsexual individuals,4 as well as other 
groups that are typically perceived as independent from one another,s 
springs from the same source, the privileging of the masculine and subor-
dination of the feminine. 6 As with discrimination to which women and 
gay persons are subject, transgender discrimination permeates every as-
pect of daily life, whether on the job (such as workplace harassment, the 
denial of a promotion, or termination of employment), in the height-
ened risk of violence (such as rape), or in the home (such as the poten-
tial for discriminatory implementation of marriage laws and custody 
determinations) . 
Transgender rights cases are thus important in themselves, in their 
attempt to redress the serious harms inflicted on individuals' lives and to 
deter future discrimination. Trans litigation further addresses a rather 
astonishing gap in sex and sexual orientation equality jurisprudence: 
The failure to remedy much of the discrimination experienced by women 
recognition of the fact that we violate gender norms simply by virtue of our same-sex 
orientation, since homo- and bisexuality confound the male-female dyad in which women 
traditionally have been subordinated to men. Green, supra note 2, at 5. 
4. For transsexual persons, their gender identity (internal sense of being a man or 
woman) conflicts with their anatomical sex at birth. C.M. Cole et aI., Treatment of Gender 
Dysphoria, 90 Tex. Med. 68-72 (1994). Female-to-male transsexual people are born with 
female bodies and have a masculine gender identity. Male-to-female transsexual people 
are born with male bodies and have a feminine gender identity. Id. Transsexual 
individuals mayor may not undergo medical treatment through hormone therapy and sex 
reassignment surgeries to bring their physical sex into alignment with their gender 
identity: They may be pre-, post-, or nonoperative. Id. As with non transsexual individuals, 
transsexual people may be gay, lesbian, bisexual, or heterosexual. Green, supra note 2, at 
79. 
5. For example, the term "transgender" also includes masculine-appearing women, 
effeminate men, cross-dressers, and intersexed individuals. Green, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
Intersexed persons, who account for approximately one of every 2000 children, are born 
with sexual anatomy that combines male and female characteristics or who undergo 
hormonal changes usually associated with the other sex. Id. at 5-6. 
6. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual 
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and FeministJurisprudence, 105 Yale LJ. I, 
18-36 (1995) (argning for a reconceptualization of the law, including cases concerning 
sexual harassment, single-sex education, sexual orientation, and transsexuality, under the 
rubric of gender); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: 
The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,3 (1995) (arguing that by 
defining sex in biological terms, the law has failed to distinguish sex from gender, and 
sexual differentiation from sex discrimination); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, 
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual 
Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1995) 
(demonstrating the existence, in law and society, of a conflation of sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation that reinforces sex/ gender hierarchies to the detriment of women and sexual 
minorities). 
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and sexual min on tIes, specifically that discrimination based on gender 
nonconfonnity. This failure is premised on a prevalent juridical assump-
tion that the law should target discrimination based on sex (Le., whether 
a person is anatomically male or female), rather than gender (i.e., 
whether a person has qualities that society considers masculine or femi-
nine).7 In both law and life, though, conceptions of sex and gender are 
so finnly cemented together that courts' frequent refusals to address gen-
der-based inequalities mean that much discrimination against women 
and sexual minorities goes unremedied.8 
Unlike feminist and les/bi/gay rights cases, only trans litigation chal-
lenges the sex system. By "sex system," I mean the law's categorization 
and regulation of persons as male or female based primarily on their gen-
italia at birth. While the women's and gay rights movements challenge, 
in their own ways, the gender roles assigued to males and females, 
neither contests the categorization of certain persons as "male" and 
others as "female." Transgender rights cases, however, challenge the sex 
system by presenting the court with people for whom gender and ana-
tomical birth sex in some way diverge. The typical conceptualization of 
sex, a doctor's peek at a newborn's genitals, is simply a fonn of shorthand 
that adequately describes sex in most cases. It is, though, an oversimplifi-
cation that fails to capture the multitude of factors that constitute sex. 
Most crucially, this shorthand overlooks a person's gender identification, 
one's internal sense of being male or female.9 This oversight is critical 
because gender identification is generally accepted within the medical 
and psychological professions as more integral to a person's sex than ana-
tomical birth sex. lO 
7. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that "the wrong of sex discrimination" 
is the law's disaggregation of sex from gender, which leaves gender discrimination 
unaddressed) . 
8. For an extensive discussion of the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, 
and the ways in which this conflation hinders equality jurisprudence, see Valdes, supra 
note 6, at 12-20. 
9. While the methods vary for categorizing the components of sex, the medical and 
psychological communities typically define sex by relying upon a number of markers, 
including external genitalia, internal reproductive organs, chromosomes, honnones, 
secondary sex characteristics, and psychological identification as male or female. While 
these factors usually "line up" to correspond either to a "male" or "female" sex designation, 
there may be disjunctions between two or more sex markers, or there may be disjunctions 
within a marker. Transsexual persons, for example, have a disjunction between markers: 
These individuals typically have the anatomical markers of one sex and a psychological 
identification as the other sex. Some intersexed persons have disjunctions within a 
marker, such as a chromosomal variation. For example, a man who has XXV chromosomes 
is generally indistinguishable from other men, except that he is infertile. Julie A. 
Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision between Law and 
Biology, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 266, 271-92 (1999). 
10. When a person is in distress because her physical anatomy differs from her gender 
identity, health care practitioners respond with the only known treatment: facilitating her 
psychological and often her honnonal and anatomical transition to her identified sex. 
Gerald Mallon, Practice with Transgendered Children, in Social Services with 
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In contrast to commentary that has focused on transgender rights 
cases as peripheral examples demonstrating principles that can inform 
mainstream sex and sexual orientation jurisprudence, I argue that trans 
litigation should be considered an integral component of feminist and 
gay rights advocacy.ll Transgender rights cases are significant not only in 
their demand for equal dignity for trans individuals, but also because we 
may not be able to achieve full legal and social equality for women and 
gay persons unless we challenge the shorthand view of sex. Even though 
transgender litigation may never be able to present a definitive under-
standing of what sex is, its greatest potential is its ability to draw attention 
to manifestations of gender discrimination that otherwise would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to address. This Essay focuses on two arenas in 
which discrimination based on sex, gender, and sexual orientation se-
verely impact a person's day-to-day life: transactions generally considered 
public, such as discrimination in the workplace or other public accommo-
dations, and the law's regulation of the private realm of marriage and 
family. Looking at three recent federal circuit court opinions arising in 
divergent contexts, Part I considers discrimination within the public 
sphere. Part II examines the private domain of family life by focusing 
primarily on several trans marriage and custody decisions. 
Transgender rights litigation presents an opportunity to broaden ju-
dicial understandings of sex by helping courts comprehend that gender 
identity, rather than anatomy, is the primary determinant of sex. This 
conceptual framework, in tum, has the potential to expand the law's ap-
proach to sex and sexual orientation discrimination claims to include in-
stances of gender-based discrimination that often are viewed as nonac-
tionable or that even may be actively perpetuated by some courts. Given 
that conceptions of gender and sex are so firmly affixed, this Essay ar-
gues, we are unlikely to eradicate gender stereotyping of that which is 
masculine or feminine without also confronting the system that catego-
rizes us as male or female. It is also my hope that trans litigation-by 
explaining that self-identification is the central component of sex-ulti-
mately may effect change by encouraging courts and society to conclude 
Transgendered Youth 49, 55-58 (Gerald Mallon ed., 1999). The generally accepted view 
among the medical and psychological professions is that efforts to alter a person's core 
gender identity are futile and unethical. ld. Formerly, some health care practitioners had 
attempted to "cure" transsexual people through aversion therapies and other techniques 
intended to alter cross-gender identification. M.G. Gelder & I.M. Marks, Aversion 
Treatment in Transvestism and Transsexualism, in Transsexualism and Sex Reassignment 
(Richard Green &John Money eds., 1969). Not only were these efforts unsuccessful, but 
they also caused severe psychological and in some cases physical damage. Mallon, supra, at 
55-58. 
11. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 6, at 7-8 (looking to transgender rights claims, 
characterized as those "at the margins," and demonstrating that these insights "apply with 
equal force to the more difficult cases of sexual identity and discrimination at the center"). 
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that the determination of one's sex should rest with the individual and 
not the state.12 
I. DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC LIFE 
A. Obstacles in Combating Gender-Based Emplayment Discrimination 
Women, gay men and lesbians, and those who are gender noncon-
forming face continual threats in employment, such as discrimination in 
hiring or promotion, workplace harassment, and outright termination. I3 
A substantial impediment to remedying such discrimination has been the 
reasoning of many lower courts that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 applies to discrimination based on anatomical sex, but not gen-
der. I4 Many lower courts have continued to follow this line of reasoning 
despite the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 15 In 
Price Waterhouse, the Court held that an employer violated Title VII when, 
in its evaluation of a female executive, the employer relied on gender 
role stereotypes of how a woman is supposed to present herself.16 In an 
effort to urge lower courts to extend its application of Price Waterhouse to 
gender discrimination, this Essay looks to several recent transgender 
rights cases and argues that they may provide a useful mode of analysis 
for combating discrimination based on gender. 
When Ann Hopkins, a senior manager at an accounting firm, was 
denied partnership, she sued her employer for sex discrimination under 
Title VIIP Evidence submitted at trial included comments from the 
12. For a provocative exploration of the necessity of halting the power of the state to 
define sex, see Paisley Currah, Defending Genders: Sex and Gender Non-Conformity in 
the Civil Rights Strategies of Sexual Minorities, 48 Hastings LJ. 1363, 1363-68 (1997). 
13. This essay focuses on federal remedies for employment discrimination under Title 
VII, a statute that courts have held does not apply to sexual orientation discrimination. 
See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-32 (9th Cir. 1979). Sexual 
orientation issues arise in Title VII litigation in same-sex harassment cases where, for 
example, plaintiffs may have been subject to anti-gay slurs. To the extent that the 
discrimination is because of sex, rather than sexual orientation, Title VII applies to same-
sex harassment. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998». 
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (forbidding an employer from depriving a 
person of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affecting that person's status as 
an employee because of that person's sex). This issue arises perhaps most pointedly in 
claims by transgendered plaintiffs, which courts traditionally have denied on the ground 
that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, but not gender. See, e.g., Ulane 
v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 1984) (construing "sex" in Title VII 
narrowly to mean only anatomical sex and not gender); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661-63 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to extend protection of Title VII to 
transsexuals because such discrimination is on the basis of "gender" rather than "sex"). 
15. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
16. Id. at 256. 
17. Id. at 231-32. 
2001] TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE 397 
firm's partners stating that AnnIS was "macho," should take "a course at 
charm school," and should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, 
dress more femininely, wear make-up [and] have her hair styled .... "19 
The Supreme Court held that comments such as these constituted evi-
dence of impermissible gender role stereotyping and that the employer 
could avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that it would have made the same decision based on a legiti-
mate reason.20 The Court stated, "[i]n the specific context of sex stere-
otyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman can-
not be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of 
gender."21 The Court expressly refuted the notion that Title VII did not 
apply to an employer's presumptions about how men and women are 
supposed to act: 
[W] e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate em-
ployees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereo-
type associated with their group, for "[i]n forbidding employers 
to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Con-
gress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treat-
ment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."22 
Referring to the partner's comment that Ann should "walk ... [and] talk 
more femininely," the Court suggested that the connection between gen-
der role stereotyping and sex discrimination is undeniable: "[It does 
not] require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee's 
flawed 'interpersonal skills' can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new 
shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her interper-
sonal skills that has drawn the criticism."23 
Prior to Price Waterhouse, a number of circuit courts had held that 
Title VII applied solely to discrimination based on sex and not to gender 
discrimination.24 Lower courts also had affirmatively invoked gender-
role stereotypes as defenses to Title VII claims. One example is the "lack 
of interest defense," in which an employer's reliance on gender-role ste-
reotypes to justify the underrepresentation of women in traditionally 
male-dominated fields exonerates an employer's disproportionate hiring 
of male employees. In the infamous case of EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
for instance, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
produced evidence demonstrating that similarly qualified women who 
had applied for Sears' higher-paying commission sales jobs were signifi-
cantly less likely to be hired than their male counterparts.25 The EEOC 
18. In an effort to counter some of the depersonalization that results from 
discrimination, this Essay refers to the parties involved by their first names. 
19. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
20. 1d. at 258. 
21. 1d. at 250. 
22. Id. at 251 (internal citations omitted). 
23. Id. at 256. 
24. See supra note 14. 
25. 839 F.2d 302, 312 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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also introduced evidence that Sears had crafted its positions with men in 
mind. As evidence of Sears' preference for male employees, Sears asked 
job applicants whether they played football or spoke in a low-pitched 
voice.26 The Seventh Circuit rejected the claim of sex discrimination by 
presuming that certain gendered preferences follow from one's sex: It 
accepted the proposition-not supported by any evidence in the re-
cord-that women are naturally less competitive than men and therefore 
shy away from the "'dog-eat-dog' competition" of the higher paying jobs 
in favor of the "more enjoyable and friendly" noncommission jobs.27 Fol-
lowing Price Waterhouse, commentators cogently argued that the Supreme 
Court's analysis in that case rejected Sears' limited view of Title VII as 
applying only to discrimination based on anatomical sex by extending 
Title VII's prohibition to reliance on gender role stereotypes.28 Based on 
the Court's focus on gender role stereotyping in Price Waterhouse, scholars 
noted that although the "lack of interest" defense presumably should not 
have survived Price Waterhouse, its vitality appears to continue 
undiminished.29 
Another example of gender-role discrimination condoned by courts 
prior to Price Waterhouse is the reasoning that Title VII provides no cause 
of action for male employees discriminated against because the employer 
perceived them as too feminine. While Ann Hopkins was protected for 
being deemed "too masculine," courts have held that men discriminated 
against for having mannerisms viewed as effeminate or for wearing attire 
considered feminine, such as an earring, do not have a cause of action 
under Title VII. 30 Like cases relying on the lack of interest defense, opin-
ions rejecting Title VII's applicability to effeminate men have yet to be 
explicitly overturned, although they recently have begun to be eroded.31 
In an additional variation on Title VII's applicability to gender role stere-
otyping, it remains unclear whether a woman following in Ann Hopkins' 
26. Id. at 332; see also Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and 
Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging 
Job Segregation, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1073, 1077 n.12 (1992) (discussing EEOC brief before 
the Seventh Circuit). 
27. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 839 
F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
28. See, e.g., Case, supra note 6, at 40-46 (discussing Supreme Court's focus on 
gender role stereotyping in the Price Waterhouse decision). 
29. See, e.g., Case, supra note 6, at 73-74 (reviewing critiques of the lack of interest 
defense); Ann C. McGinley, Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title 
VII, 9 Cornell J.L. & Pub. pory 415, 467-72 (discussing the continuing success, in the 
context of race and sex discrimination, of the lack of interest defense to Title VII claims). 
30. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(rejecting, among other claims, a Title VII claim by male employee who was fired for 
wearing an earring); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(holding that male employee fired for effeminacy had no cause of action under Title VII). 
31. See infra notes 35-71 and accompanying text (discussing Schwenk v. Hartford, 
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000), and Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 
2000)). 
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shoes would be protected if the firm had refused her partnership for be-
ing "too feminine" in the aggressive world of corporate finance.32 
B. Transgender Rights Litigation: Potential for Change 
The failure of many courts to fully implement Price Waterhouse re-
flects a broader dysfunction that exists across sex and sexual orientation 
equality jurisprudence, "the continuing devaluation," as Mary Anne Case 
describes it, "of qualities deemed feminine."33 Case urges a challenge to 
this devaluation in part by bringing workplace claims on behalf of effemi-
nate men, reasoning that "the world will not be safe for women in frilly 
pink dresses ... until it is made safe for men in dresses as well."34 Build-
ing on Case's claim, I argue that women are unlikely to be viewed as 
equal to men until the law recognizes that some women have penises and 
some men have vaginas. In an important recent shift, three federal cir-
cuit opinions considered discrimination claims by gender nonconform-
ing plaintiffs. Rather than adopt the discordant approach of permitting 
recovery solely for discrimination based on anatomical sex, these appel-
late opinions acknowledge the profound harms that flow from discrimi-
nation due to failure to conform to gender roles, and, in particular, from 
the devaluation of femininity. In each case, the court recognized that the 
plaintiffs-who were born anatomically male and have a feminine iden-
tity or characteristics-were targeted not only for their gender noncon-
formity, but also for their identification with the subordinate role of the 
feminine. Examining these cases provides possible direction for sex 
equality jurisprudence and demonstrates how trans litigants may help 
pave the way for women and gay individuals to realize more comprehen-
sive legal protections. 
l. Schwenk v. Hartford. - The Ninth Circuit's decision in Schwenk 
v. Hartford is the first circuit opinion to state, albeit in dicta, that Title 
VII's protections extend to persons deemed inappropriately feminine.35 
In Schwenk, the court considered a claim under the Eighth Amendment 
and the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA)36 by a male-to-female 
transsexual prisoner, Crystal Marie Schwenk, based on her assertion that 
a prison guard, Robert Mitchell, had attempted to rape her.37 In analyz-
32. See Case, supra note 6, at 3, 44-46. 
33. Id. at 3. 
34. Id. at 7. 
35. 204 F.3d at 1201-02. 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). Shortly after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Schwenk, 
the Supreme Court struck down section 13981 of the Gender Motivated Violence Act on 
the ground that Congress lacked the authority to enact it under either the Commerce or 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 
1744-45 (2000). 
37. Crystal Marie, who is anatomically male, was incarcerated in a men's prison, 
although she had configured her life from a young age to conform to that of her gender 
identity. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1193. Consistent with current professional health care 
standards, this Essay attempts to respect the dignity and autonomy of transgender people 
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ing Crystal Marie's claim under the Gender Motivated Violence Act, the 
Ninth Circuit looked to the approach that federal courts have taken in 
Title VII sex discrimination cases.38 Although not binding, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning sets forth a framework that may, and I argue should, be 
influential in future Title VII jurisprudence. 
The Schwenk defendant argued that the attack on Crystal Marie was 
motivated not by gender, but by her transsexuality, which he claimed was 
not an element of actionable gender-based animus.39 To determine what 
was meant by "gender," the Ninth Circuit noted that federal courts for 
years had interpreted Title VII as applying only to discrimination on the 
basis of sex and as inapplicable to discrimination based on gender.40 
Under this view, the Ninth Circuit explained, persons such as Crystal 
Marie who are anatomically male but "whose outward behavior and in-
ward identity did not meet social definitions of masculinity" were denied 
protection under Title VII on the ground that "they were the victims of 
gender, rather than sex, discrimination."41 In a striking departure from 
this line of reasoning, the Ninth Circuit concluded that these opinions 
have been "overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse."42 
The Schwenk court explained that after Price Waterhouse, Title VII "barred 
not just discrimination based on the fact that Hopkins was a woman, but 
also discrimination based on the fact that she failed 'to act like a wo-
man'-that is, to conform to socially-constructed gender expectations."43 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Price Waterhouse expanded the interpre-
tation of Title VII to include "[d]iscrimination because one fails to act in 
the way expected of a man or woman."44 Because the defendant's assault, 
as alleged, stemmed from Robert Mitchell's belief "that the victim was a 
by acknowledging her or his self-designated gender identification. See, e.g., Gianna E. 
Israel & Donald E. Tarver II, Transgender Care: Recommended Guidelines, Practical 
Information, and Personal Accounts 7 (1997) ("[O]ne should refer to transgender 
individuals on the basis of their current presentation or their specified pronoun 
preference."); B.R. Beemer, Gender Dysphoria Update, 34 J. Psychosocial Nursing & 
Mental Health Services 12, 18 (1996) ("[C]aregivers have a responsibility to acknowledge 
the self-chosen identity of their clients."). The Ninth Circuit in Schwenk takes this 
approach as well, see Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1192 n.1. Deferring to a person's chosen gender 
identity is consistent with the approach of other courts. See, e.g., Murray v. United States 
Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1716, at *1 n.l (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 
1997) (per curiam) (referring to a transgender individual's sex by the person's self-
identification); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 409 n.l (7th Cir. 1987) (same); 
Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740 n.2 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (same). 
38. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1200-02. 
39. Id. at 1200. 
40. Id. at 1201. For examples of federal circuit court opinions that had ruled that 
Title VII applied only to sex-based and not to gender-based discrimination, see supra note 
14. 
41. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 1201-02. 
44. Id. at 1202. The Ninth Circuit applied this interpretation to the Gender 
Motivated Violence Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), as the statute's legislative history 
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man who 'failed to act like' one," the Ninth Circuit held that the attack 
constituted gender-based violence under the GMVA.45 
The analysis in Schwenk is significant in a number of respects. First, 
the Ninth Circuit is able to recognize two seemingly opposing views of 
Crystal Marie's sex. The appellate court understood that Robert Mitchell 
attacked the plaintiff because he viewed Crystal Marie as "a man who 
'failed to act like' one;" the court also acknowledged Crystal Marie's self-
identity as female, and, in a manner respectful of that identity, referred to 
the plaintiff using feminine pronouns.46 The Ninth Circuit's opinion is 
able to encompass this apparent incongruity because the court's view of 
"sex" incorporates the notion of "gender" as well. The terms" 'sex' and 
'gender,''' the court reasoned, "have become interchangeable."47 Recog-
nizing sex as more than anatomy is important not only to transgender 
rights advocates,48 but to women's rights advocates as well. By effectively 
adopting the argument that sex discrimination jurisprudence has wrongly 
disaggregated sex from gender,49 the Ninth Circuit diminishes many of 
the obstacles that have long stymied feminists. Recall the "lack of inter-
est" defense put forward in EEOC v. Sears-the notion that fewer women 
applied for the higher-paying commission sales jobs because women are 
predisposed to be less competitive than men.50 The defendant's invoca-
tion of this gender-role stereotype (particularly when coupled with evi-
dence that Sears had created the sales position with deep-voiced, football-
playing applicants in mind) provides strong support for the conclusion 
that Sears had structured the job and the application process based on its 
gendered notions of how men and women are supposed to act-precisely 
what the partners were prohibited from doing in Price Waterhouse. The 
Schwenk court's application of Title VII to cases in which the plaintiff was 
discriminated against for nonconformity with expected gender roles may 
provide useful precedent for remeding the law's devaluation of things 
deemed feminine. For instance, a male employee fired for wearing an 
earring should have a claim under Title VII because he was discriminated 
against for failing to conform to the masculine gender role expectation 
that men do not accessorize. 
convinced the court that Congress intended the GMVA to have the same reach as Title VII. 
Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201-02. 
45. 204 F.3d at 1202. 
46. Id. at 1192 n.l. 
47. Id. at 1202. 
48. This recognition is particularly important for transgender rights advocates 
because it suggests that conceptions of gender may be able to act on and affect 
understandings of sex. By referring to Crystal Marie as "she," the Ninth Circuit recognizes, . 
at least lingnistically, that a person born anatomically male can be female. 
49. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 6, at 4 ("Ultimately, there is no principled way to 
distinguish sex from gender, and concomitantly, sexual differentiation from sexual 
discrimination.") . 
50. See supra notes 25-27 (discussing EEOC v. Sears Roebuck). 
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The reasoning in Schwenk also may help lesbian and gay rights advo-
cates in Title VIl harassment and discrimination claims brought by mas-
culine-appearing women or effeminately-perceived men. Employers have 
attempted to escape liability by arguing that they were engaged not in sex 
discrimination, but in (often permitted) sexual orientation discrimina-
tion. The Supreme Court's decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, Inc. suggests one such example.51 In Oncale, the Court held that 
Joseph Oncale's sexual harassment suit against his male coworkers could 
go forward and remanded it for a determination of whether the harass-
ment he suffered was "because of ... sex" under Title VII.52 Joseph's 
male coworkers had repeatedly harassed him by grabbing his crotch, sub-
jecting him to anti-gay slurs, and engaging in a mock rape. 53 If this case 
had gone back to trial, a district court that did not include gender in its 
understanding of sex might conclude that the harassment was not be-
cause of sex, but rather was because of sexual orientation, a form of dis-
crimination prohibited neither under Title VII nor by Texas law. Such a 
ruling would have missed the point: There is no evidence that Joseph was 
harassed because his coworkers actually believed he was gay. 54 Instead, 
the evidence suggested that Joseph was targeted because his slight build 
presumably was deemed to be more feminine than the physiques of his 
fellow coworkers. 55 If a trier of fact were to apply Schwenk's rationale on 
remand, a court would have ample grounds on which to find that Jo-
seph's assaults stemmed from the perpetrators' belief "that the victim was 
a man who 'failed to act [or look] like' one," an actionable form of sex 
discrimination. 56 
2. Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co. - The First Circuit recently 
recognized Title VII's applicability to discrimination based on noncon-
formity with gender roles in Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust CO.57 In Rosa, 
the appellate court rejected a defendant bank's claim that discrimination 
against a man because of his feminine attire could not constitute sex dis-
crimination.58 An employee of Park West Bank told Lucas Rosa, who is 
anatomically male, that she "would not provide him with a loan applica-
tion until he 'went home and changed [the dress he was wearing].' "59 In 
response to Lucas' sex discrimination claim under the Equal Credit Op-
51. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
52. Id. at 79. 
53. Id. at 77. 
54. To the contrary, the only evidence concerning Oncale's sexual orientation was his 
marriage to a woman. Chris Bull, Same-Sex Harassment, The Advocate, Nov. 25, 1997, at 
30. 
55. Morning Edition: Supreme Court and Same-Sex Harassment (National Public 
Radio broadcast, Dec. 3, 1997, transcript # 97120313-210). 
56. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000). 
57. 214 F.3d 213 (lst Cir. 2000). 
58. Id. at 214. 
59. Id. 
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portunity Act (ECOA), 60 the district court had granted the bank's motion 
to dismiss, stating: 
The issue in this case is not [Lucas'] sex, but rather how he 
chose to dress when applying for a loan. Because the [ECOA] 
does not prohibit discrimination based on the manner in which 
someone dresses, Park West's requirement that [Lucas] change 
his clothes does not give rise to claims of illegal 
discrimination.61 
The district court's opinion was consistent with the line of cases rul-
ing that an employer may make hiring or termination decisions on the 
ground that a male applicant or employee dressed in a manner or dis-
played traits typically deemed feminine.62 The First Circuit's reversal of 
the district court's decision breaks free from courts' past unwillingness to 
apply Price Waterhouse to persons who are considered inappropriately fem-
inine. Looking to Title VII to help interpret the Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act, the First Circuit rejected the district court's assertion that Price 
Waterhouse was inapposite.63 Instead, it quoted the Supreme Court's 
statement in Price Waterhouse that "stereotyped remarks [including state-
ments about dressing more 'femininely'] can certainly be evidence that 
gender played a part [in a discriminatory act] ."64 In contrast to the dis-
trict court's more cramped reading of mode of dress as nothing more 
than behavior, the First Circuit focused on the larger question of whether 
gender stereotypes are at issue. The appellate court explained: 
It is reasonable to infer that [the bank employee] told [Lucas] 
to go home and change because she thought that [his] attire 
did not accord with his male gender: in other words, that ... 
the Bank [had treated] a woman who dresses like a man differ-
ently than a man who dresses like a woman.65 
The appellate court subsequently remanded the case for the lower court 
to determine whether sex discrimination was at issue.66 
Rosa is significant in its protection for those who are gender noncon-
forming, including not only cross-dressers such as Lucas, but also for 
transsexual persons (for whom dressing as their identified gender typi-
cally is a prerequisite for sex reassignment surgery),67 and for masculine-
appearing women or effeminate men.68 The First Circuit's focus on gen-
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994). 
61. Rosa, 214 F.3d. at 214. 
62. See supra note 14. For an in-depth critique of these and similar cases, see Case, 
supra note 6, at 46-56. 
63. Rosa, 214 F.3d at 214-15. 
64. Id. at 216 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1988». 
65. Id. at 215-16. 
66. Id. at 216. 
67. See Israel & Tarver, supra note 37, at 10-12 (describing the "real-life test" that 
requires a transgender person to live as a member of the opposite sex before obtaining sex 
reassignment surgery). 
68. In fact, the Connecticut Human Rights Commission ("Commission") recently 
invoked both Rosa and Schwenk in interpreting the state's sex discrimination statute to 
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der stereotyping also may set the stage for claims by gender-typical wo-
men who are denied employment despite their qualifications based on 
the employer's view that feminine characteristics are not appropriate for 
the job. Additionally, lesbian and gay rights advocates may rely on Rosa. 69 
Despite the appellate court's conclusion that the ECOA would not apply 
if the bank employee had thought Lucas was gay, the First Circuit empha-
sized the actionability of discrimination based on gender-variance.7o 
Some gay men and lesbians are likely to be subject to discrimination 
based both on their gender nonconformity and sexual orientation. In 
such a circumstance, plaintiffs could set forth a cause of action for sex 
and, where applicable, sexual orientation discrimination. In other cases, 
gay men and lesbians may be able to demonstrate that they were discrimi-
nated against not because of their sexual orientation, but because of their 
nonconforming gender presentation.71 
3. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS. - While Hernandez-Montiel v. INS ad-
dresses a claim for political asylum, it promises to provide a useful mode 
of analysis in a wide range of sex- and sexual orientation-based claims, 
including those concerning employment discrimination, domestic vio-
prohibit discrimination against transgendered individuals. Connecticut Comm'n on 
Human Rights and Opportunities, Declaratory Ruling on Behalf of John/Jane Doe (Nov. 
9, 2000) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). While noting that older federal cases such 
as Holloway and Ulane had interpreted Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination to 
exclude transgendered persons, the Commission rejected the rationale of these cases. Id. 
at 4-10. Instead, the Commission invoked the reasoning of the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Price Waterhouse, which, the Commission stated, made clear that "having specific 
expectations that a person will manifest certain behavior based upon his or her gender is 
not only conceptually outmoded sexual stereotyping, but also an unlawful form of sex 
discrimination." Id. at 5. The Commission further noted that the Supreme Court's 
decision in Oncale, holding that male-on-male sexual harassment can be actionable under 
Title VII, reveals a shift away from traditional notions of sex discrimination. Id. at 6. 
In another recent ruling, the Massachusetts Superior Court issued an order allowing a 
transgender student, who identifies as female and who is anatomically male, to attend 
school in traditionally female attire. Doe v. Yunits, CIY No. 00-1060-A (Mass. Sup. Ct. filed 
Oct. 11,2000) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
69. In fact, this case provides an example of women's and les/bi/gay rights advocates' 
increasing awareness of the interrelationships among sex, gender, and sexual orientation 
discrimination: Two feminist organizations, the National Organization for Women and 
the Equal Rights Advocates. filed an amicus brief in support of Lucas Rosa. and he was 
represented by the Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders. Rosa, 214 F.3d at 213. 
70. Rosa, 214 F.3d at 216 & n.l (noting that while the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Massachusetts state law does). 
7l. Plaintiffs who have suffered discrimination on multiple bases find themselves 
peculiarly disadvantaged in the law, which may require a plaintiff to effectively "choose" 
one basis for the discriminatory acts to the exclusion of the others. For a thought-
provoking account of this intersectionality bind, applied in the context of women of color 
who are subject to violence, see Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stanford L. 
Rev. 1241 (1991). 
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lence and rape, and violations of equal protection.72 Geovanni Her-
nandez-Montiel, who from a young age had realized he was gay and who 
displayed a feminine manner and mode of dress, was a minor who fled 
his Mexican homeland at age fifteen.73 In testimony that the immigra-
tion judge found "credible," "sincere," and "forthright," Geovanni de-
scribed being permanently expelled from the Mexican public school sys-
tem at the age of ten, forcibly institutionalized by his family, and raped 
twice within a span of two weeks by the Mexican police when he was four-
teen.74 He fled to the United States shortly thereafter.75 Because Ge-
ovanni had been abused based on his homosexuality, Hernandez-Montiel 
could be viewed as a gay rights case; given that he was also abused for 
transgressing gender norms, it could be viewed as a trans rights case.76 
Regardless of the assigned label, the fact that Geovanni's persecution 
stemmed in large part from his gender nonconformity required the 
Ninth Circuit to analyze gender oppression in a way that demonstrates 
the interconnections among acts of discrimination based on sex, gender 
nonconformity, and sexual orientation. While neither the immigration 
judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) doubted that Ge-
ovanni had been persecuted, both ruled that he was not eligible for asy-
lum because he was not a member of a "particular social group" as re-
quired by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 77 Although 
precedent determined that sexual orientation may constitute a "particu-
lar social group" under the INA,78 the immigration judge and BIA con-
72. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). In the interest offull disclosure, while Director of 
the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights Project of the ACLU Foundation of 
Southern California (ACLU), I sen'ed as co-counsel for amicus curiae on behalf of the 
petitioner, Geovanni Hernandez-Montiel. The views expressed in this Essay are mine 
alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the ACLU, the litigants, or other amici. 
73. Id. at 1088. 
74. Id. at 1088-89. 
75. Id. (discussing Geovanni's attempts to enter the United States). 
76. There is the possibility that Geovanni could be described as "transsexual" because 
his female gender identity and use of female hormones are suggestive of transsexuality. 
The Ninth Circuit noted this and determined that it had no bearing on the "particular 
social group" inquiry in this case. Id. at 1095 n.7. The "particular social group" inquiry 
looks to whether the applicant is viewed-within the society from which she or he is fleeing 
persecution-as a member of a social group subject to oppression. Geovanni identified as 
a member of a recognized social group within Mexico, that of gay men with female sexual 
identities, and he was persecuted on that basis. 1d. at 1088. The Ninth Circuit thus 
resen'ed the question whether transsexuals constitute a particular social group under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at 1095-96. Given that, as discussed immediately 
below, the court's holding is grounded in large part on Geovanni's persecution due to 
gender nonconformity, it seems likely that under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, 
transsexuals would constitute a particular social group for asylum purposes. 
77. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (1994), an 
applicant may establish refugee status if she demonstrates past persecution or a well-
founded fear of future persecution based on, inter alia, her membership in a particular 
social group. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1091-93. 
78. This interpretation was adopted nationwide in an order issued by the Attorney 
General in 1994. Id. at 1094 (discussing Attorney General Order No. 1895-94 Uune 19, 
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cluded that Geovanni had been abused not because of his sexual orienta-
tion, but because of the way he dressed.79 Based on the uncontested 
expert evidence of the heightened vulnerability to persecution that gay 
men with effeminate mannerisms or characteristics face,8o the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed. The court concluded that gay men with female sexual 
identities constitute "a separate social entity within Latin American soci-
ety," that its members are "heavily persecuted," and that Geovanni, a 
member of this group, had been subjected to such persecution.81 
The Ninth Circuit's more encompassing view of sex may be particu-
larly helpful for women's rights advocates. The Ninth Circuit examined 
the issue of subordination by men of women and feminized men through 
sexual activity. In concluding that Geovanni was subject to persecution, 
the Ninth Circuit relied on expert testimony that abuse of gay men in 
Mexico stems less from the fact of same-sex sexual activity per se82 and 
more from the devaluation of men who are viewed as having "lowered" 
themselves into the subjugated position of women: "[G]ay men with fe-
male sexual identities," the court determined, "are singled out for perse-
cution because they are perceived to assume the stereotypical 'female,' 
i.e., passive, role in gay relationships."83 The court's acknowledgment 
that sexual activity can in some contexts be an expression of domination 
over persons deemed feminine could prove useful in some Title VII 
claims. For instance, such analysis may provide support for a plaintiff's 
claim that a co-worker's repeated comments about or depictions of sexual 
activity created a hostile work environment. Hernandez-Montiel's discus-
sion of sexual subordination may also be useful in cases concerning do-
mestic violence and rape. The BIA had ruled that "[Geovanni's] rape by 
the policemen and the attack by a mob of gay bashers are not necessarily 
persecution" because "[his] mistreatment arose from his conduct."84 
The Ninth Circuit replied that if "the BIA was referring to Geovanni's 
effeminate dress or his sexual orientation ... as a justification [for vio-
lence]," such reasoning amounted to no more than the discredited and 
offensive" 'you asked for it' excuse for rape."85 In rape cases, women 
faced with such a defense-for example, that a rapist should be exoner-
1994), that designated the BIA's decision in Toboso-Alfonoso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819, 820-23 
(BIA 1990), as precedent). 
79. Id. at 1089-90. The BIA had described Geovanni's manner of dress as that of "a 
male prostitute," even though there was no evidence that Geovanni had ever been a 
prostitute or had been involved in any criminal activity. The Ninth Circuit responded 
rather dryly that it did "not venture to guess the non-record basis of the BIA's assumption 
of how a male prostitute dresses." Id. at 1095. 
80. Id. at 1094-95. 
81. Id. at 1094 (quoting expert testimony). 
82. Id. at 1089 (discussing expert testimony that same-sex sexual activity between 
men, before marriage at least, may be socially acceptable in Mexico as long as a man 
"performs the role of the man" sexually). 
83. Id. at 1089. 
84. Id. at 1098. 
85. Id. at 1098. 
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ated because the victim was dressed "provocatively" -could invoke the 
Ninth Circuit's rejection of such arguments as nothing more than imper-
missible gender-based stereotyping that revictimizes the victim.86 
The analysis in Hernandez-Montiel may be of further use in statutory 
and constitutional sexual orientation discrimination challenges. Like the 
bank in Rosa, the immigration judge and BIA had characterized Ge-
·ovanni's gender presentation as an unprotected form of conduct: "If he 
wears typical female clothing sometimes and typical male clothing other 
times," the immigration judge reasoned, Geovanni "cannot characterize 
his assumed female persona as immutable or fundamental to his iden-
tity."87 The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, relied upon the expert testimony 
and determined that "Geovanni manifests his sexual orientation by 
adopting [feminine] gendered traits. "88 
Defendants in sexual orientation discrimination cases often make an 
argument similar to this "not-sex-but-clothes" reasoning. Invoking Bowers 
v. Hardwick, which upheld against a due process challenge the criminal-
ization of sodomy,89 many defendants argue "not-homosexuality-but-con-
duct" by claiming that the adverse action they took against the plaintiffs 
was not on account of the plaintiffs' sexual orientation, but was in re-
sponse to their presumed conduct: participation in the crime of sod-
omy.90 Similarly, in equal protection claims, the state often argues that 
heightened constitutional scrutiny does not apply to classifications based 
on sexual orientation, reasoning that gay persons are effectively indistin-
guishable from the class of persons engaging in sodomy.91 To counter 
86. See, e.g., Barbara Fromm, Sexual Battery: Mixed-Signal Legislation Reveals Need 
for Further Reform, 18 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 579, 591-93 (1991) (detailing statements from 
Floridajury that acquitted a defendant charged with rape because of the manner in which 
the complainant had been dressed). 
87. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1089. In so ruling, the immigration judge and BIA 
effectively negated Geovanni's claim: One factor that a court looks at in making the 
"particular social group" determination is whether the group is united by a characteristic 
that the members cannot or should not be required to change. Id. at 1093. 
88. Id. at 1095. 
89. 478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986). In fact, the BIA in Hernandez-Montiel invoked Hardwick 
for the proposition that "anti-sodomy laws are not persecution." 225 F.3d at 1098. The 
Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning, which it called "convoluted, inapposite, and 
irrelevant," on the ground that Geovanni had not claimed persecution based on sodomy 
laws but was instead raped by police officers who had forced him to engage in sodomy. Id. 
90. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, ll4 F.3d 1097, 1104-05 (llth Cir. 1997) (en banc) 
(upholding lesbian attorney's termination from state attorney general's office on ground 
of conflict with state sodomy statute); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) 
(transferring custody from lesbian mother to grandmother and stating that existence of 
state sodomy statute is an "important consideration" in gay or lesbian custody 
determinations) . 
91. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (rejecting 
heightened scrutiny for gay persons on the ground that "there can hardly be more 
palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class 
criminal"); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting heightened scrutiny 
for gay persons based on similar reasoning). 
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such arguments, plaintiffs making statutory or constitutional discrimina-
tion claims could invoke the Hernandez-Montiel court's analysis. Based on 
expert testimony that Geovanni's gender presentation constituted a fun-
damental aspect of his identity,92 the Ninth Circuit concluded that "Gust] 
because Geovanni can change his clothes [does not mean that] he can 
change his identity .... This case is about sexual identity, not fashion."93 
The Ninth Circuit's refusal to equate status with conduct may provide a 
useful model in sexual orientation, transgender, and sex discrimination 
claims. Whether the defendant asserts that the disparate treatment was 
in response to a lesbian's presumed sodomitic conduct (rather than her 
sexual orientation), a transsexual woman's transition from anatomic male 
to female (rather than her sex), or a man's decision to wear an earring 
(rather than his gender nonconformity), the Ninth Circuit's approach in 
Hernandez-Montiel recognizes the integral nature of sexual identity and 
rejects the attempt to characterize such identities as nonessential and be-
havior-based. 
II. DISCRIMINATION IN THE PRIVATE REALM 
Transgender marriage and custody cases offer the potential to un-
dercut entrenched notions of gender that impede unbiased evaluation in 
many family law cases involving gay men and lesbians, as well as single 
mothers. Both single mothers and gay parents face the claim that their 
families are deficient because the children are "fatherless," and that this 
purported lack is responsible for widespread social deterioration: "Sepa-
ration of children from their fathers is 'the leading cause of declining 
child well-being in our society .... [and is] the engine driving our most 
urgent social problems, from crimes to adolescent preguancy to child 
abuse to domestic violence.' "94 The premise of the emphasis on fathers 
92. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1095. 
93. Id. at 1096. In dicta, the Ninth Circuit goes on to distinguish Geovanni from a 
cross-dresser, which the court states is someone "who dresses in clothing of the opposite 
sex for psychological reasons." Id. The court's suggestion that cross-dressers may not 
constitute a particular social group for asylum purposes is inconsistent with the rest of its 
opinion: If undertaken "for psychological reasons," it is difficult to imagine why cross-
dressing would not be fundamental to one's identity. As discussed above, a different 
ground for protecting cross-dressers from discrimination, which also can have beneficial 
ramifications for women's and gay rights advocates, is that discrimination against a person 
for gender nonconforming dress constitutes impermissible sex role stereotyping. See 
supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text. 
94. Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 
1997 U. 111. L. Rev. 833, 859 (quoting David Blankenhorn, Fatherless America: 
Confronting Our Most Urgent Social Problem 1 (1995)). In his discussion of "father-
absent" families, Wardle discusses as equivalent, for purposes of a child's psycho-social 
development, a child raised by two women or two men with a family in which one parent 
has died, id. at 863-64, which arguably accounts (at the expense of negating one parent in 
each gay couple) for the melding of lesbian-headed and single mother families into one 
category. It remains unclear why proponents of the "fatherlessness" theory characterize 
families headed by gay fathers as "fatherless." One explanation, not directly put forward by 
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is that women and men, by virtue of their sex, have a different and de-
fined set of gendered skills that they bring to parenting. Based on the 
belief that gender attributes follow ineluctably from anatomical sex, op-
ponents of single- or gay-parenthood argue that children need to be 
raised by one parent of each sex to receive the full complement of 
parenting skills and to develop a "normal" gender identity themselves.95 
Opinions in custody cases often reflect this anxiety about gender, which 
tends to be expressed differently for gay parents (where the concern typi-
cally centers on the child's gender role development) than for single 
mothers (where the focus tends to be on the mother's deviation from 
cultural expectations of motherhood). If, in contrast, a court is able to 
recognize that anatomy is not necessarily tied to sex, then the perceived 
naturalness of gender roles, whether assigned to the children or the par-
ents, may be undercut as well. 
A. Obstacles Facing Les/Bi/Gay and Women's Rights Advocates 
1. Lesbian and Gay Parents. - Some courts have taken drastic mea-
sures when faced with the prospect of a child who fails to conform to 
gender roles, particularly when the child's parents are lesbian or gay. In 
Ward v. Ward, for example, a state appellate court affirmed a change of 
custody from the child's lesbian mother, who had been the primary care-
taker, to her father, who had been convicted of murdering his first wife.96 
Claiming that it was "not suggesting that the sexual orientation of the 
custodial parent by itself justifies a custody change,"97 the state court 
nonetheless proceeded to weigh the father's admitted commission of 
murder against his accusations concerning the mother's child-raising 
abilities. All of the father's accusations correlate quite neatly with anti-
lesbian stereotypes: First (perhaps drawing on the notion that gay people 
are hyper-sexual), the father claimed that the eleven-year-old daughter 
had made lewd sexual references to her stepmother; second (echoing the 
notion of lesbians as unkempt, unfeminine women), he claimed that the 
child had bad grooming habits and table manners; and third, the father 
testified that the daughter had a preference for men's cologne (appar-
ently implying that the child was influenced by her lesbian mother's pre-
sumably mannish ways).98 
Significantly, the Ward court acknowledged that the evidence con-
cerning the father's first two allegations could be interpreted in ways 
which did not reflect negatively on the mother's child-rearing abilities.99 
the theory's proponents, is that gay men, because gendered as feminine by society, are not 
viewed as "real men" and hence cannot be "real" fathers. 
95. Wardle, supra note 94, at 857-58. 
96. 742 So.2d 250, 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
97. Id. at 254. 
98. Id. at 252-53. 
99. Id. at 252-54 (stating that lack of good grooming habits and table manners are 
not necessarily unusual for an eleven-year-old, and observing that the child's claimed 
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The only piece of evidence that the court did not view as equivocal was 
the girl's preference for men's cologne. Without elaborating on how the 
child's preference could be attributable to her mother or why her aroma 
preference would be detrimental to her, the court transferred custody of 
the daughter to the father. lOO Given the absence of other evidence jnsti-
fying the court's ruling, it seems that the appellate court was acting based 
on unsubstantiated presumptions that the mother's lesbianism was some-
how masculinizing her daughter and that this was an outcome to be 
avoided at almost any cost. lOl 
Even some courts presented with a multitude of studies demonstrat-
ing that children of gay parents are just as developmentally healthy as 
those raised by non-gay parentsl02 have presumed that heterosexuality is 
sexual statements were "equally susceptible to an interpretation that has no particular 
sexual reference"). 
100. In an apparent attempt to downplay the potential harm to the child from being 
placed in the custody of a parent who had been convicted of murder-particularly of a 
family member-the Ward court noted that the father showed remorse by stating at the 
custody trial that the murder was the result of "stupidity, jealousy, and anger." 1d. at 252. 
No appeal was taken from this decision because, sadly, the child's mother died of a heart 
attack shortly after custody was transferred. Gady A. Epstein, Death Ends Lesbian Mom's 
Custody Case, Tampa Trib., Jan. 23, 1997, at B6. 
101. Some opponents of gay-parenting attempt to lend an air of legitimacy to fears of 
gender nonconformity in children by invoking Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood 
(GIDC), a diagnosis of mental illness that applies to children who pervasively reject many 
of the gender roles that the feminist movement has been fighting for years. American 
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 533 (4th ed. 
1994) (manifestations in boys include an interest in "[sltereotypical female-type dolls, such 
as Barbie ... and ... little interest in cars and trucks" and in girls include having "intense 
negative reactions to ... wear[ing] dresses or other feminine attire" and identifying with 
"powerful male figures, such as Batman or Superman"). It is possible that a court such as 
that in Ward could point to the mere existence of GIDC as a mental illness in an attempt to 
buttress a determination that custody decisions may be based in part on an estimation of 
which parent is more likely to "encourage" a child's development in conformity with 
traditional gender roles. 
A GIDC diagnosis is distinct from a diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder (GID) in 
adults. Adults diagnosed with GID generally are transsexual and must receive the 
diagnosis to gain access to hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgery. Shannon 
Minter, Diagnosis and Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder in Children, in Sissies & 
Tomboys: Gender Nonconformity & Homosexual Childhood 9, 11 (Matthew Rottnek ed., 
1999). In contrast, few children diagnosed with GIDC are transsexual as adults, while the 
vast majority of these children grow up to be gay or lesbian. Id. In fact, it appears that the 
former labeling of adult homosexuality as a mental illness has simply been reconfigured as 
a childhood disorder: In addition to the fact that most children diagnosed with GIDC 
grow up to be gay or lesbian, GIDC was added as a mental illness to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual in the edition immediately following the removal of homosexuality from 
the manual. Id. at 12. Indeed, some researchers point to the existence of GIDC to support 
calls to reclassiry homosexuality as a mental illness. Id. at 13. 
102. See, e.g., American Psychological Association, Lesbian and Gay Parenting: A 
Resource for Psychologists 8 (1995) (stating that "[n]ot a single study has found children 
of gay or lesbian parents to be disadvantaged in any significant respect relative to cbildren 
of heterosexual parents"); Charlotte]. Patterson & Richard E. Redding, Lesbian and Gay 
Families with Children: Implications of Social Science Research for Policy, 52]. Soc. Issues 
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somehow a "known" quantity and hence represents a more prudent cus-
todial choice. For example, in Ex ParteJM.F., the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama acknowledged that the mother's expert had reviewed at least fifty 
studies, all subject to peer review, which consistently found that children 
of lesbian and gay parents are no more likely to be gender nonconform-
ing or gay than those raised by heterosexual parents.103 The state court 
also noted that the court-appointed psychologist had recommended that 
custody "be determined on ... individual character and parenting skills" 
rather than on sexual orientation 104 and that experts indicated that the 
child was thriving in her mother's care.105 The state court, however, af-
firmed that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
the harm to children from gay parenting is uncertain.106 The higher 
court substantiated its finding by pointing to a handful of claims that chil-
dren are adversely affected by same-sex parenting-claims that have been 
rejected by mainstream health care researchers.107 The state court then 
presumed, without pointing to any evidence, that the father's marriage 
was "successful" and that the "developmental benefit" to children of het-
erosexual marriage was "undisputed."lo8 The state court also criticized 
the mother's explanation to her daughter that same-sex relationships are 
"the social and moral equivalent of a heterosexual marriage"109 and it 
repeatedly noted with disapproval the daughter'S statement that "girls 
could marry girls and boys could marry boys."llo Rejecting the over-
whelming multitude of social science studies before it, the Alabama Su-
preme Court relied instead on its own notions of how men and women 
(and boys and girls) are meant to relate to one another in determining 
which parent is best suited to raise their child. 
The argument that children require one parent of each sex for "nor-
mal" gender-role development also has served as the basis for states de-
29, 41 (1996) (summarizing studies involving over three hundred children of gay and 
lesbian parents and concluding that these children are as developmentally healthy as those 
raised by heterosexual parents). 
103. 730 So.2d 1190, 1193 (Ala. 1998). Although beyond the scope of this Essay, an 
essential claim for feminist and gay rights advocates to make is the normative assertion that 
gender nonconformity and homosexuality are a moral good. Under this approach, 
advocates would assert that these qualities are an equally desirable developmental outcome 
as heterosexuality and conformity with gender roles. For an excellent discussion of this 
issue concerning sexual orientation, see generally Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, 
Morality and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 237, 241 (1996) (setting out 
argument that same-sex love embodies the same moral goods as does heterosexual love). 
104. Ex PartefM.F., 730 So.2d at 1192. 
105. Id. For example, the child's therapist recommended that custody remain with 
the mother, and even the court-appointed guardian ad litem, who recommended a change 
in custody based on a conflict among claims about the development of children of gay 
parents, testified that the child was thriving and had a strong bond with her mother. ld. 
106. Id. at 1195-96. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 1196. 
109. Id. at 1195. 
110. Id. at 1192-95. 
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fending their restriction of marriage to different-sex couplesYl In its 
case against same-sex marriage, Vermont argued that children need to 
experience the "innate and unique" qualities and skills "that each sex 
possesses,"1l2 an argument similar to that made by Hawaii.1l3 While the 
Hawaii trial court flatly rejected the state's argument,114 the Vermont 
court's response was more ambivalent. In Baker v. Vermont, the court re-
jected the state's argument based not on the substance of the claim, but 
because the court did not believe that this was the actual state interest 
motivating the marriage ban: Vermont had recently passed legislation 
that provided siguificant legal protections to lesbian- and gay-parented 
families, a position that the court ruled was "diametrically at odds" with 
the state's purported opposition to gay parenting.l15 Concerning the 
substance of the claim that children require male and female role models 
for optimal development, the Vermont court was more equivocal, stating 
that the "experts disagree" and describing "the answer" as "decidedly un-
certain."1l6 Even in Baker-a momentous opinion requiring Vermont to 
provide same-sex couples who desire to marry public benefits and protec-
tions equivalent to those that married heterosexual couples receive1l7-if 
the outcome had turned on conclusions to be drawn from claims about 
the gender roles provided by same-sex parents, a favorable outcome for 
plaintiffs would not have been assured. ll8 Reliance on social science 
data, then, while crucial, may not in itself be sufficient to refute claims 
111. See Baehrv. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56 (Haw. 1993), rev'd sub nom., 994 P.2d 566 
(Haw. 1999); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999). 
112. See Mary Bonauto et aI., The Freedom to Marry for Same-Sex Couples: The 
Opening Appellate Brief of Plaintiffs Stan Baker et al. in Baker et al. v. State of Vermont, 5 
Mich. J. Gender & L. 409, 446 (1999). 
113. See id. at 444 n.133 (listing the scientific reports used by the Hawaii court to 
reject the claim that the well-being of children will be harmed by same-sex marriage). 
114. See Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 
3, 1996), rev'd and remanded, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999). Mter the trial court held that 
Hawaii failed to meet its constitutional burden and that the state's ban on same-sex 
marriage violated the state constitution's guarantee of equal protection, id., the Hawaii 
Constitution was amended to give the state legislature the power to "reserve marriage to 
opposite-sex couples." Baehr, 994 P.2d at 567 (quoting article I, section 23 of the Hawaii 
Constitution). As part of a political compromise to ensure successful amendment of the 
state constitution, the first statewide domestic partnership bill was passed, although it 
ultimately failed to provide health care benefits or parenting rights usually awarded to 
married heterosexual couples. All Things Considered: Hawaii Same-Sex Ruling (National 
Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 8, 1998, transcript # 98040812-212). 
115. Baker, 744 A.2d at 884. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 886. 
118. See id. In response to the supreme court's ruling, the Vermont legislature 
enacted "civil union" legislation, which provides all of the legal benefits and protections 
afforded by marriage in the state of Vermont. Brian MacQuarrie, VT House Approves Bill 
Allowing Same-Sex Unions, Boston Globe, Apr. 26, 2000, at AI. While the civil union 
legislation is an unprecedented victory for les/bi/gay rights advocates, a Vermont "civil 
union" remains legally distinct from "marriage." That the Vermont legislature refused to 
simply revise the existing marriage statute and instead created an entirely new system of 
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that children are best off if raised by one male and one female parent. By 
bringing transgender marriage and custody claims, lesbian and gay rights 
advocates directly require the court to confront the notion that gender's 
legitimacy comes from its congruence with anatomical sex. 
2. Single and Working Mothers. - Transgender rights cases have the 
potential to loosen the fixity of gender-role stereotypes that courts con-
tinue to apply to women in custody disputes, particularly to single and 
working mothers. Gender bias surveys undertaken in various states sug-
gest that, in contested cases,1l9 state courts tend to apply more exacting 
parenting standards to mothers than to fathers. Findings in surveys con-
ducted in Colorado, Massachusetts, and New York, for example, suggest 
that voluntary relinquishment of custody by women is viewed with greater 
disapproval than voluntary relinquishment by men. 120 The studies also 
have found that women's long-term sexual relationships tend to count 
against them, whereas men's relationships often are viewed favorably, and 
that working mothers tend to be judged in a more critical light than 
working fathers. 121 In addition, studies suggest that a woman may be es-
pecially vulnerable to losing custody if the father has established a tradi-
tional household by remarrying.122 These findings are often reflected in 
court opinions. In the 1998 decision of Black v. Black, for instance, a state 
appellate court invoked the mother's voluntary and temporary transfer of 
custody and her intimate relationship as factors to justify its denial of cus-
tody.123 The mother in Black had allowed the child to live with her ex-
husband for nine months during a time when she had begun to cohabi-
tate with the man whom she ultimately married. The court portrayed her 
as selfish and unmotherly, concluding that she had made "a calculated 
decision ... in favor of her relationship ... and against having her daugh-
ter with her."124 The court further based its decision to grant the father 
recognition for gay men and lesbians suggests that while "separate" may be "equivalent," it 
is not necessarily "equal." 
119. Approximately ninety percent of custody disputes are resolved without resort to 
the courts and their resolution unsurprisingly mirrors the paradigm of woman-as-
caretaker: In nearly all privately determined custody arrangements, the mother is selected 
as the custodial parent. Lisa Genasci, Increasingly, Working Mothers Lose in Custody 
Fights, L.A. Times,Jan. 20, 1995, at 08. For the remaining contested cases, the outcome is 
significantly different: It is estimated that fathers are awarded joint or sole custody nearly 
seventy percent of the time. Id. 
120. Susan Chira, Custody Case Stirs Debate on Bias Against Working Women, N.Y. 
Times, July 31, 1994, at A31 (discussing gender bias surveys conducted in Colorado and 
New York); Genasci, supra note 119, at 08 (discussing Massachusetts gender bias survey 
that found that women separated from their children were more likely than absent fathers 
to lose custody and that mothers' new intimate relationships were judged critically, 
whereas fathers' new relationships were often seen as a sign of stability). 
121. Genasci, supra note 119, at 08. 
122. Chira, supra note 120, at A31. 
123. Black v. Black, No. 0IAOI-9801-CV-00056, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 429, at *4 
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 1, 1998). 
124. Id. at *6. 
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custody on the mother's "inconstancy" and her "willingness to give her 
own convenience and satisfaction a higher priority."125 Similarly, in Low-
ery v. Lowery, a state appellate court affirmed a change of custody to the 
father on the ground that the father had remarried, painting the picture 
of a traditional family headed by the father, contrasting it against the less 
affluent, single-mother household.126 
Case law suggests that another double-bind faced by mothers in con-
tested custody disputes is that the scope of permissible variation within 
"acceptable" limits for work outside the borne appears to be narrower for 
women than men. Ajob outside the home, the cases suggest, is generally 
appropriate, but working long or the "wrong" hours is not. Public aware-
ness of this quandary spiked in the wake of custody battles involving high 
profile women with demanding careers, such as OJ. Simpson prosecutor 
Marcia Clark and Senate judiciary aide Sharon Prost.127 Women similarly 
have been denied custody on the ground that they worked nontraditional 
hours, such as weekends or nights, even if these schedules permitted 
more time overall with the children. In Gann v. Bryowsky, for example, 
the trial court granted custody to the mother, a night nurse who worked 
either three or four night shifts per week.128 The court of appeals over-
turned this decision as an abuse of discretion, holding that it was clear 
error for the lower court to have granted custody to the mother when the 
father could spend all evenings (but fewer full days) with the child. 129 
Custody litigation further suggests that fathers frequently are judged by 
the availability of child-care provided by persons other than themselves, 
while many mothers are judged by their own personal ability to care for 
the child. 130 Some courts have also conditioned a custodial award to the 
mother on the ground that she stay home with a young child, even 
125. Id. at *9. The court also focused fixedly on the mother's nonmarital 
cohabitation and was dismissive of her subsequent marriage, intimating that the marriage 
might be little more than a litigation tactic. Id. at *5-*6 (stating that "[o]nly after this 
litigation was filed" did mother and stepfather "make the commitment to marriage," and 
that mother "gave up" custody to pursue a relationship "which only resulted in marriage 
just before depositions were taken in this case"). 
126. Lowery v. Lowery, No. CA 85-235, 1985 Ark. App. LEXIS 2262, at *2 (Ark. Ct. 
App. Dec. 11, 1985) (stating that "the [father] had remarried ... was purchasing a home 
rather than living in an apartment ... [and that he and] his wife were expecting a new 
baby"). 
127. Alice Steinbach, Career vs. Children: Women Face Difficult Choice, Baltimore 
Sun, Mar. 13, 1995, at ID (discussing Marcia Clark custody dispute); Genasci, supra note 
119, at D8 (discussing denial of custody to Sharon Prost). 
128. 676 So.2d 1317, 1319 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995). 
129. Id. at 1321. In a similar situation, a mother who was a flight attendant 
purposefully arranged her schedule to work some weekend days and nights in order to 
have part of each day with her daughter, as well as three full days free during the week. 
She lost custody to her ex-husband, who worked a "day job" five days a week. Steinbach, 
supra note 127, at ID. 
130. Linda Feldmann & Gloria Goodale, Custody Cases Test Attitudes of Judges, 
Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 15, 1995, at lA. 
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though an award to the father would have resulted in day-care. 131 In 
each of these cases, women are running up against the idealized arche-
type ofwoman-as-nurturer. When other aspects of a woman's life surface, 
such as work or an intimate relationship, she is viewed as falling short of 
the mark of a "good mother," a mark for which there is no male 
equivalent. Because transgender custody cases may enlarge a court's un-
derstanding of "woman" to include some persons born anatomically 
male, such a paradigmic shift promises to loosen much of the force be-
hind the division of women and men into the respective gender roles of 
"nurturer" and "provider." 
B. Transgender Rights Litigation: Potential for Change 
A New Jersey Superior Court embarked on the path of separating the 
conception of sex from anatomy nearly twenty-five years ago. In M. T. v. 
J T., a husband claimed that he had no duty to support his estranged wife 
on the ground that his marriage was invalid: He argued that his wife, a 
male-to-female transsexual woman, was legally male.132 In upholding the 
validity of the marriage, the court explained that sex is comprised of 
more than a person's genitalia at birth: "[T]he evidence before this 
court teaches that there are several criteria ... which may be relevant in 
determining the sex of an individual."133 The court noted the agreement 
among most experts that the crucial component of sex is gender identity, 
one's sense of self as male or female, which is firmly established at a 
young age. 134 While a person's anatomical sex is usually aligned with 
gender identity and thus appears to be determinative, the court ex-
plained, when the two are discordant, "the facts of one's anatomy are 
really secondary."135 The New Jersey court thus recognized that the com-
ponents that determine sex typically include, but are far broader than, 
anatomical birth sex. 
This fuller understanding of sex may be helpful in sex and sexual 
orientation nondiscrimination jurisprudence because of what it suggests 
about gender roles. Courts frequently view deviation from traditional 
gender roles, by either the parent or the child, as a basis for denial or 
modification of custody.136 Trans litigation offers the unique opportu-
nity to directly address and refute the view of sex and gender as inextrica-
ble from anatomy, which challenges the perceived fixity of gender roles. 
Consider, for example, the case of Vecchione v. Vecchione, in which a wo-
man attempted to void her marriage to her husband, a female-to-male 
131. Id. (discussing case of Debbie Langford, in which ajudge explicitly based grant 
of custody to mother on promise that she would quit job and not return to work until child 
was in school full-time). 
132. 355 A.2d 204, 205 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
133. Id. at 208. 
134. ld. at 205. 
135. Id. (quoting expert testimony). 
136. See supra Part II.A. 
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transsexual man, on the ground that he was legally female. 137 Effectively 
adopting an understanding of sex that is broader than one's anatomy at 
birth, the court concluded that the state legislature granted legal recogni-
tion to sex reassignment when it enacted a statute permitting post-opera-
tive transsexual persons to change the sex designation on their birth cer-
tificates. 138 Mter holding that the husband, Joshua Vecchione, was 
legally male, the court awarded him fifty percent custody of their child. 139 
It could be argued that, far from resulting in a more expansive un-
derstanding of sex, courts such as those in M. T. and Vecchione are simply 
overlaying the law's paradigmatic approach to sex onto transsexual mar-
riages. While the process that the courts are using is one of precedent, 
the result is not simply a reproduction of the traditional view of sex. By 
recognizing that sex may be decoupled from anatomy, and given that 
"gender" has come to be viewed as a surrogate for "sex," these opinions 
provide a means of disentangling gender from anatomy. For instance, 
Joshua Vecchione's life experiences, like those of other transgendered 
individuals, confound notions such as "father-absence." Has Joshua's 
daughter-raised by a man whom she calls "daddy," whom medical ex-
perts declare male, and who by all appearances is indistinguishable from 
any other man-been growing up without a father? What "gender" of 
skills is he bringing to parenting? If the man before the court was (or is) 
anatomically indistinguishable from a woman, this undermines the asser-
tion that there is something integral that a parent conveys to a child by 
virtue of biology; it undermines the claim that children require one male 
and one female parent for optimal gender role development. 
While both M. T. and Vecchione involve post-operative transsexual per-
sons, I do not mean to imply that feminists and gay rights advocates 
should limit themselves to bringing cases on behalf of persons whose sex-
ual anatomy now corresponds to their gender identity. To the contrary, 
the ultimate goal of the proposed litigation is to capture much of the 
currently irremediable discrimination that affects a multitude of persons 
whose gender is in some way perceived to be in conflict with their sex.140 
There is, however, an advantage to bringing some cases on behalf of post-
137. See, e.g., Vecchione v. Vecchione, No. 95D003769 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed Apr. 23, 
1996). In the interest of full disclosure, I acted as co-counsel for Joshua Vecchione on 
behalf of the ACLU, in conjunction with the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR). 
The views expressed in this Essay are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
ACLU, Mr. Vecchione, or NCLR. 
138. Vecchione, No. 95D003769 Minute Order 1-2 (Nov. 26, 1997) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
139. Telephone Interview with Shannon Minter, Senior Staff Attorney, National 
Center for Lesbian Rights (Jan. 20, 2001) (confirming initial award of fifty percent custody 
of child to Joshua Vecchione, following court's determination of validity of the couple's 
marriage). 
140. For example, advocates could bring litigation on behalf of persons who are not 
transsexual but who are gender nonconforming, or on behalf of transsexual persons who 
have not undergone complete (or any) sex reassignment surgery or hormone therapy. 
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operative transsexual persons in a heterosexual marriage. Advocates can 
attempt to use the laws created to privilege the system of hetero-patri-
archyas an instrument to begin to chip away at the system itself.141 There 
are innumerable such laws, from the generative monopoly grant of mar-
riage rights to heterosexuals, to the presumption that a child born during 
the marriage is the couple's legal child,142 to the alternative insemination 
presumption that the woman's husband (and not the sperm donor) is the 
child's legal father. 143 It is precisely this access to heterosexual entitle-
ment that facilitates the process of slowly dismantling the law's enforce-
ment of gender norms.144 
Even if we were to assume that trans litigation ultimately broadens 
the juridical views of sex and gender, some may ask whether cases such as 
M. T. and Vecchione run the risk of reinscribing marriage as a solely heter-
osexual union.145 This is a serious concern: The court in M. T., for exam-
ple, explicitly addressed the issue of whether the parties had to be of 
different sexes for the marriage to be valid and concluded that a "legisla-
tive intent ... which would sanction a marriage between persons of the 
same sex, cannot be fathomed."146 This is not a necessary outcome, how-
ever. In Vecchione, the court determined that the validity of same-sex mar-
riage was not before it and that to address the issue would be to unneces-
sarily raise the question of the marriage statute's constitutionality.147 
Importantly, even unsuccessful transgender marriage and custody cases 
141. By "hetero-patriarchy," I mean the social and legal privileging of men and 
masculine norms through the systems of sex and sex orientation inequality, which work in 
tandem to maintain rigid sex and gender role differentiation. I have adopted this 
understanding from Valdes, supra note 6, at 8 nn.12-14. 
142. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 111 (1989) (upholding statutory 
presumption that child born during the marriage is the couple's legal child). 
143. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 7613 (West 1994) (providing that husband is legal 
father of child conceived through donor artificial insemination when insemination is 
perfonned with husband's consent and under physician's supervision). 
144. See, e.g., infra notes 148-157 and accompanying text (describing how some gay 
and lesbian transsexuals have availed themselves of rulings refusing to recognize the post-
operative sex of transsexual persons by legally marrying their partners). 
145. Another objection to taking on trans litigation is that, because of courts' relative 
unfamiliarity with, and the greater social marginalization of, transgendered persons, courts 
are likely to be even less receptive to transgender rights claims than to sex and sexual 
orientation discrimination challenges. The potential hostility of the courts is a substantial 
barrier faced by trans advocates and all others who are disempowered. As many of the 
cases discussed above demonstrate, however, the hurdle need not be insurmountable. 
Contrary to what one might expect based on projected political views, for example, two of 
the three judges who decided Hernandez-Montiel were Reagan appointees; the Vecchione case 
was decided in Orange County, California, which is known as a conservative stronghold; 
and M. T. was decided nearly twenty-five years ago. Moreover, even though advocates 
inevitably will encounter judicial hostility, the benefits of undertaking transgender rights 
litigation, described in this Essay, are potentially far-reaching. 
146. M.T. v.J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 208 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
147. Record at 4-5 (Nov. 21, 1997), Vecchione v. Vecchione, No. 95D003769 (Cal. 
Sup. Ct. filed Apr. 23, 1996) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (including statement by 
the court that "I don't have to go that far nor do I plan to"). 
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may present an opportunity to transform the terms of the debate. Some 
states and foreign jurisdictions have ruled that post-operative transsexuals 
remain legally defined by their anatomical sex at birth.148 In Littleton v. 
Prange, for example, the Texas Court of Appeals ruled that Christie Lit-
tleton, a male-to-female transsexual woman, did not have standing to 
bring a medical malpractice claim arising out of the death of her hus-
band.149 Phrasing the issue before the court as whether "a person's gen-
der [is] immutably fixed by our Creator at birth,"15o the court reasoned 
that, because sex reassignment surgery does not alter chromosomes or 
result in the creation of a womb, cervix, or ovaries, "a post-operative fe-
male transsexual is still a male."151 Under this reasoning, the appellate 
court held that Christie's marriage was invalid.152 Does this mean that 
Christie is not entitled to marry anyone at all? Presumably, Christie has 
the same empty right to marry as do gay men and lesbians: She can 
marry someone deemed to be the "opposite" sex, which, under Littleton's 
logic, would be another woman. 
While Christie is heterosexual and is thus effectively denied the right 
to marry, gay and lesbian transsexuals can and have married their part-
ners in Texas. Jessica and Robin Wicks were the first lesbian couple mar-
ried in Texas following the Littleton court's ruling.153 Although a lesbian 
couple in the eyes of most (including themselves), they are considered a 
married, heterosexual couple in the eyes of Texas, since Jessica is a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual woman. Turning lemons into lem-
onade, Christie Littleton's lawyer has sent out an invitation world-wide, 
urging similarly situated couples "to take a week's vacation [in San 
Antonio] and get married."154 Similar marriages have been reported in 
148. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 121 
S.Ct. 174 (2000) (holding that the state does not legally recognize post-operative 
transsexual persons as their post-operative sex); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. 
Ct. 1987) (same); Corbett v. Corbett, 2 W.L.R. 1306 (P. 1970) (same). For an in-depth 
analysis of the Littleton case, see Julie A. Greenberg, When is a Man a Man, and When is a 
Woman a Woman?, 52 Fla. L. Rev. 745 (2000). 
149. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 23I. 
150. Id. at 224. 
151. Id. at 230. Given the court's emphasis on internal reproductive organs, it is 
unclear how the court would classify women who have undergone hysterectomies, 
particularly if they have a chromosomal anomaly. 
152. Id. 
153. Adolfo Pesquera, Lesbian Couple get License to Wed; Transsexual Ruling Clears 
the Way, San Antonio Express-News, Sept. 7, 2000, at B1. 
154. Id. In fact, five days after Jessica and Robin's wedding, another lesbian couple 
legally married. John Gutierrez-Mier, 2 More Women Obtain County Marriage License, 
San Antonio Express-News, Sept. 21, 2000, at B7. 
2001] TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE 419 
Oregon,155 Utah,156 and England,157 These cases highlight the incon-
gruity of limiting the definition of "sex" to one's birth anatomy and the 
definition of "marriage" to persons differently sexed. 
While these marriages are currently sensationalized, they are increas-
ing in number. Familiarity may breed contempt, but it also may help 
diminish some of the fear and dehumanization that often accompanies 
the awareness of a person's gender nonconformity. I am not predicting a 
sudden, radical shift in views towards gender-variance; I am simply refer-
ring to the incremental, yet important developments already taking 
place. In M. T v. J T., for instance, the court carefully recounted the 
wife's personal progression from a child who wore feminine clothes to an 
adult who underwent sex reassignment surgery and had a decade-long 
relationship with the man who became her husband.15s The New Jersey 
court concluded its opinion by looking at what the ruling was likely to 
mean for the wife, "M.T.," as a person: "Such recognition [of M.T. as 
female] will promote the individual's quest for inner peace and personal 
happiness, while in no way disserving any societal interest .... "159 Media 
reports of the Vecchione case similarly conveyed the day-to-day quality of 
Joshua's life with his daughter,160 Conveying the humanness of M.T. and 
Joshua not only breaks down some of the myths and prejudice surround-
ing transgendered individuals, but also helps dispel the biases faced by 
the wide spectrum of persons whose lives fall outside of expected gender 
norms, including nontraditional mothers and gay parents. 
CONCLUSION 
Far from being outliers on the edge of civil rights advocacy, trans-
gender rights cases promise to playa central role in advancing a broad 
movement for equality that encompasses the rights of women, gay men 
and lesbians, and gender variant persons within its scope. An antidis-
crimination suit brought by a woman on the grounds of sex or sexual 
orientation discrimination importantly challenges the notion of who a wo-
man can be: She may be masculine, like Ann Hopkins, or may have con-
figured her intimate life around another woman, like many lesbian 
155. Oregon Couple Adds Twist to Love Story: The Bride and Groom Plan to Wed 
Legally, But Then the Man Intends To Have His Gender Altered, News Trib. (Tacoma, 
Wash.), Dec. 14, 1996, at A3. 
156. Michael Vigh, Transsexual Weds Woman in Legally Recognized Union, Salt Lake 
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mothers. An antidiscrimination suit brought by a transgendered woman, 
in contrast, challenges the notion of who can be a woman: Like Crystal 
Marie Schwenk, she may be someone born physiologically male. By con-
testing the social and jurisprudential reliance on biological sex as the 
fixed marker of gender identity, trans litigation holds the potential to 
defuse the power of gender as a mechanism for discrimination. 
